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Abstract. We present a payload-based anomaly detector, we call PAYL, for 
intrusion detection. PAYL models the normal application payload of network 
traffic in a fully automatic, unsupervised and very effecient fashion. We first 
compute during a training phase a profile byte frequency distribution and their 
standard deviation of the application payload flowing to a single host and port. 
We then use Mahalanobis distance during the detection phase to calculate the 
similarity of new data against the pre-computed profile. The detector compares 
this measure against a threshold and generates an alert when the distance of the 
new input exceeds this threshold. We demonstrate the surprising effectiveness 
of the method on the 1999 DARPA IDS dataset and a live dataset we collected 
on the Columbia CS department network. In once case nearly 100% accuracy is 
achieved with 0.1% false positive rate for port 80 traffic.  
1   Introduction 
There are many IDS systems available that are primarily signature-based detectors. 
Although these are effective at detecting known intrusion attempts and exploits, they 
fail to recognize new attacks and carefully crafted variants of old exploits. A new 
generation of systems is now appearing based upon anomaly detection. Anomaly 
Detection systems model normal or expected behavior in a system, and detect 
deviations of interest that may indicate a security breach or an attempted attack.  
 Some attacks exploit the vulnerabilities of a protocol, other attacks seek to survey 
a site by scanning and probing. These attacks can often be detected by analyzing the 
network packet headers, or monitoring the network traffic connection attempts and 
session behavior. Other attacks, such as worms, involve the delivery of bad payload 
(in an otherwise normal connection) to a vulnerable service or application. These may 
be detected by inspecting the packet payload (or the ill-effects of the worm payload 
execution on the server when it is too late after successful penetration). State of the art 
systems designed to detect and defend systems from these malicious and intrusive 
events depend upon “signatures” or “thumbprints” that are developed by human 
experts or by semi-automated means from known prior bad worms or viruses. They do 
not solve the “zero-day” worm problem, however; the first occurrence of a new 
unleashed worm or exploit.  
Systems are protected after a worm has been detected, and a signature has been 
developed and distributed to signature-based detectors, such as a virus scanner or a 
firewall rule. Many well known examples of worms have been described that 
propagate at very high speeds on the internet. These are easy to notice by analyzing 
the rate of scanning and probing from external sources which would indicate a worm 
propagation is underway. Unfortunately, this approach detects the early onset of a 
propagation, but the worm has already successfully penetrated a number of victims, 
infected it and started its damage and its propagation. (It should be evident that slow 
and stealthy worm propagations may go unnoticed if one depends entirely on the 
detection of rapid or bursty changes in flows or probes.)  
Our work aims to detect the first occurrences of a worm either at a network system 
gateway or within an internal network from a rogue device and to prevent its 
propagation. Although we cast the payload anomaly detection problem in terms of 
worms, the method is useful for a wide range of exploit attempts against many if not 
all services and ports.  
In this paper, the method we propose is based upon analyzing and modeling normal 
payloads that are expected to be delivered to the network service or application. These 
normal payloads are specific to the site in which the detector is placed. The system 
first learns a model or profile of the expected payload delivered to a service during 
normal operation of a system. Each payload is analyzed to produce a byte frequency 
distribution of those payloads, which serves as a model for normal payloads. After this 
centroid model is computed during the learning phase, an anomaly detection phase 
begins. The anomaly detector captures incoming payloads and tests the payload for its 
consistency (or distance) from the centroid model. This is accomplished by comparing 
two statistical distributions. The distance metric used is the Mahalanobis distance 
metric, here applied to a finite discrete histogram of byte value (or character) 
frequencies computed in the training phase. Any new test payload found to be too 
distant from the normal expected payload is deemed anomalous and an alert is 
generated. The alert may then be correlated with other sensor data and a decision 
process may respond with several possible actions. Depending upon the security 
policy of the protected site, one may filter, reroute or otherwise trap the network 
connection from being allowed to send the poison payload to the service/application 
avoiding a worm infestation.  
There are numerous engineering choices possible to implement the technique in a 
system and to integrate the detector with standard firewall technology to prevent the 
first occurrence of a worm from entering a secured network system.  We do not 
address the correlation function and the mitigation strategies in this paper; rather we 
focus on the method of detection for anomalous payload. 
This approach can be applied to any network system, service or port for that site to 
compute its own “site-specific” payload anomaly detector, rather than being dependent 
upon others deploying a specific signature for a newly detected worm or exploit that 
has already damaged other sites. As an added benefit of the approach described in this 
paper, the method may also be used to detect encrypted channels which may indicate 
an unofficial secure tunnel is operating against policy.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work in 
network intrusion detection. In Section 3 we describe the model and the anomaly 
detection technique. Section 4 presents the results and evaluations of the method 
applied to different sets of data and it’s run time performance. One of the datasets is 
publicly available for other researchers to verify our results. Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
2   Related Work 
 There are two types of systems that are called anomaly detectors: those based upon a 
specification (or a set of rules) of what is regarded as “good/normal” behavior, and 
others that learn the behavior of a system under normal operation. The first type relies 
upon human expertise and may be regarded as a straightforward extension of typical 
misuse detection IDS systems. In this paper we regard the latter type, where the 
behavior of a system is automatically learned, as a true anomaly detection system.   
Rule-based network intrusion detection systems such as Snort and Bro use hand-
crafted rules to identify known attacks, for example, virus signatures in the application 
payload, and requests to nonexistent services or hosts. Anomaly detection systems 
such as SPADE [5], NIDES [6], PHAD [13], ALAD [12] compute (statistical) models 
for normal network traffic and generate alarms when there is a large deviation from 
the normal model. These systems differ in the features extracted from available audit 
data and the particular algorithms they use to compute the normal models. Most use 
features extracted from the packet headers. SPADE, ALAD and NIDES model the 
distribution of the source and destination IP and port addresses and the TCP 
connection state. PHAD uses many more attributes, a total of 34, which are extracted 
from the packet header fields of Ethernet, IP, TCP, UDP and ICMP packets. 
Some systems use some payload features but in a very limited way. NATE is 
similar to PHAD; it treats each of the first 48 bytes as a statistical feature starting from 
the IP header, which means it can include at most the first 8 bytes of the payload of 
each network packet. ALAD models the incoming TCP request and includes as a 
feature the first word or token of each input line out of the first 1000 application 
payloads, restricted only to the header part for some protocols like HTTP and SMTP.  
The work of Kruegel et al [8] describes a service-specific intrusion detection 
system that is most similar to our work. They combine the type, length and payload 
distribution of the request as features in a statistical model to compute an anomaly 
score of a service request. However, they treat the payload in a very coarse way. They 
first sorted the 256 ASCII characters by frequency and aggregate them into 6 groups: 
0, 1-3, 4-6, 7-11, 12-15, and 16-255, and compute one single uniform distribution 
model of these 6 segments for all requests to one service over all possible length 
payloads. They use a chi-square test against this model to calculate the anomaly score 
of new requests. In contrast, we model the full byte distribution conditioned on the 
length of payloads and use Mahalanobis distance as fully described in the following 
discussion. Furthermore, the modeling we introduce includes automatic clustering of 
centroids that is shown to increase accuracy and dramatically reduce resource 
consumption.  The method is fully general and does not require any parsing, 
discretization, aggregation or tokenizing of the input stream (eg, [14]).  
Network intrusion detection systems can also be classified according to the 
semantic level of the data that is analyzed and modeled. Some of the systems 
reconstruct the network packets and extract features that describe the higher level 
interactions between end hosts like MADAMID [9], Bro [15], EMERALD [18], 
STAT [24], ALAD [13], etc. For example, session duration time, service type, bytes 
transferred, and so forth are regarded as higher level, temporally ordered features not 
discernible by inspecting only the packet content. Other systems are purely packet-
based like PHAD [14], NATED [12], NATE [23]. They detect anomalies in network 
packets directly without reconstruction. This approach has the important advantage of 
being simple and fast to compute, and they are generally quite good at detecting those 
attacks that do not result in valid connections or sessions, for example, scanning and 
probing attacks.  
3   Payload Modeling and Anomaly Detection 
There are many design choices in modeling payload in network flows. The primary 
design criteria and operating objectives of any anomaly detection system entails: 
•    automatic “hands-free” deployment requiring little or no human intervention,  
• generality for broad application to any service or system, 
• incremental update to accommodate changing or drifting environments, 
• accuracy in detecting truly anomalous events, here anomalous payload, with 
low (or controllable) false positive rates, 
• resistance to mimicry attack and 
• efficiency to operate in high bandwidth environments with little or no impact 
on throughput or latency.  
These are difficult objectives to meet concurrently, yet they do suggest an approach 
that may balance these competing criteria for payload anomaly detection.  
We chose to consider “language-independent” statistical modeling of sampled data 
streams best exemplified by well known n-gram analysis. Many have explored the use 
of n-grams in a variety of tasks. The method is well understood, efficient and 
effective. The simplest model one can compose is the 1-gram model. A 1-gram model 
is certainly efficient (requiring a linear time scan of the data stream and an update of a 
small 256-element histogram) but whether it is accurate requires analysis and 
experimentation. To our surprise, this technique has worked surprisingly well in our 
experiments as we shall describe in Section 4. Furthermore, the method is indeed 
resistant to mimicry attack. Mimicry attacks are possible if the attacker has access to 
the same information as the victim to replicate normal behavior. In the case of 
application payload, attackers (including worms) would not know the distribution of 
the normal flow to their intended victim. The attacker would need to sniff for a long 
period of time and analyze the traffic in the same fashion as the detector described 
herein, and would also then need to figure out how to pad their poison payload to 
mimic the normal model. 
3.1   Length Conditioned n-gram Payload Model 
Network payload is just a stream of bytes. Unlike the network packet headers, payload 
doesn’t have a fixed format, small set of keywords or expected tokens, or a limited 
range of values. Any character or byte value may appear at any position of the 
datagram stream. To model the payload, we need to divide the stream into smaller 
clusters or groups according to some criteria to associate similar streams for modeling. 
The port number and the length are two obvious choices. We may also condition the 
models on the direction of the stream, thus producing separate models for the inbound 
traffic and outbound responses.  
Usually the standard network services have a fixed pre-assigned port number: 20 
for FTP data transmission, 21 for FTP commands, 22 for SSH, 23 for Telnet, 25 for 
SMTP, 80 for Web, etc.  Each such application has its own special protocol and thus 
has its own payload type. Each site running these services would have its own “typical 
payload” flowing over these services. Payload to port 22 should be encrypted and 
appear as uniform distribution of byte values, while the payload to port 21 should be 
primarily printable characters entered by a user and a keyboard.  
Within one port, the payload length also varies over a large range. The most 
common TCP packets have payload lengths from 0 to 1460. Different length ranges 
have different types of payload. The larger payloads are more likely to have non-
printable characters indicative of media formats and binary representations (pictures, 
video clips or executable files etc.). Thus, we compute a payload model for each 
different length range for each port and service and for each direction of payload flow. 
This produces a far more accurate characterization of the normal payload than would 
otherwise be possible by computing a single model for all traffic going to the host. 
However, many centroids might be computed for each possible length payload 
creating a detector with a large resource consumption..  
To keep our model simple and quick to compute, we model the payload using n-
gram analysis, and in particular the byte value distribution, exactly when n=1. An n-
gram is the sequence of n adjacent bytes in a payload unit. A sliding window with 
width n is passed over the whole payload and the occurrence of each n-gram is 
counted. N-gram analysis was first introduced by [2] and exploited in many language 
analysis tasks, as well as security tasks. The seminal work of Forrest [3] on system call 
traces uses a form of n-gram analysis (without the frequency distribution and allowing 
for “wildcards” in the gram) to detect malware execution as uncharacteristic sequences 
of system calls.  
For a payload, the feature vector is the relative frequency count of each n-gram 
which is calculated by dividing the number of occurrences of each n-gram by the total 
number of n-grams. The simplest case of a 1-gram computes the average frequency of 
each ASCII character 0-255. Some stable character frequencies and some very variant 
character frequencies can result in the same average frequency, but they should be 
characterized very differently in the model. Thus, we compute in addition to the mean 
value, the variance and standard deviation of each frequency as another characterizing 
feature.. So for the payload of a fixed length of some port, we treat each character’s 
relative frequency as a variable and compute its mean and standard deviation as the 
payload model.  
Figure 1 provides an example showing how the payload byte distributions vary 
from port to port, and from source and destination flows.  Each plot represents the 
characteristic profile for that port and flow direction (inbound/outbound). Notice also 
that the distributions for ports 22 (inbound and outbound) show no discernible pattern, 
and hence the statistical distribution for such encrypted channels would entail a more 
uniform frequency distribution across all of the 256 byte values, each with low 
variance. Hence, encrypted channels are fairly easy to spot. Notice that this figure is 
actually generated from a dataset with only the first 96 bytes of payload in each 
packet, and there is already a very clear pattern with the truncated payload. Figure 2 
displays the variability of the frequency distributions among different length payloads. 
The two plots characterize two different distributions from the incoming traffic to the 
same web server, port 80 for two different lengths, here payloads of 200 bytes, the 
other 1,460 bytes. Clearly, a single monolithic model for both length categories will 





 Example byte distributions for 
different ports.  For each plot, the X-axis 
is the ASCII byte 0-255, and the Y-axis is 
the average byte frequency 
 
Fig. 2.
 Example byte distribution for 
different payload lengths for port 80 on 
the same host server
Given a training data set, we compute a set of models Mij. For each specific 
observed length i of each port j, Mij stores the average byte frequency and the standard 
deviation of each byte’s frequency. The combination of the mean and variance of each 
byte’s frequency can characterize the payload within some range of payload lengths. 
So if there are 5 ports, and each port’s payload has 10 different lengths, there will be 
in total 50 centroid models computed after training. As an example, we show the 
model computed for the payload of length 185 for port 80 in figure 3, which is derived 
from a dataset described in Section 4.  (We also provide an automated means of 




 The average relative frequency of each byte, and the standard deviation of the frequency 
of each byte, for payload length 185 of port 80 
PAYL operates as follows. We first observe many exemplar payloads during a 
training phase and compute the mean and variance of the byte value distribution 
producing model Mij. During detection, each incoming payload is scanned and its byte 
value distribution is computed. This new payload distribution is then compared against 
model Mij; if the distribution of the new payload is significantly different from the 
norm, the detector flags the packet as anomalous and generates an alert.  
The means to compare the two distributions, the model and the new payload, is 
described next. 
3.2   Simplified Mahalanobis Distance 
Mahalanobis distance is a standard distance metric to compare two statistical 
distributions. It is a very useful way to measure the similarity between the (unknown) 
new payload sample and the previously computed model. Here we compute the 
distance between the byte distributions of the newly observed payload against the 
profile from the model computed for the corresponding length range. The higher the 
distance score, the more likely this payload is abnormal.  
The formula for the Mahalanobis distance is:  
)()(),( 12 yxCyxyxd T −−= −  
where x and y  are two feature vectors, and each element of the vector is a 
variable. x is the feature vector of the new observation, and y is the averaged feature 
vector computed from the training examples, each of which is a vector. And 1−C is the 
inverse covariance matrix as ),( jiij yyCovC = . ji yy , are the ith and jth elements of  
the training vector. 
The advantage of Mahalanobis distance is that it takes into account not only the 
average value but also its variance and the covariance of the variables measured. 
Instead of simply computing the distance from the mean values, it weights each 
variable by its standard deviation and covariance, so the computed value gives a 
statistical measure of how well the new example matches (or is consistent with ) the 
training samples.   
In our problem, we use the “naïve” assumption that the bytes are statistically 
independent. Thus, the covariance matrix C becomes diagonal and the elements along 
the diagonal are just the variance of each byte.  
Notice, when computing the Mahalanobis distance, we pay the price of having to 
compute multiplications and square roots after summing the differences across the 










where the variance is replaced by the standard deviation. Here n is fixed to 256 
under the 1-gram model (since there are only 256 possible byte values). Thus, we 
avoid the time-consuming square and square-root computations (in favor of a single 
division operation) and now the whole computation time is linear in the length of the 
payload with a small constant to compute the measure. This produces an exceptionally 
fast detector (recall our objective to operate in high-bandwidth environments).  
For the simplified Mahalanobis distance, there is the possibility that the standard 
deviation iσ equals zero and the distance will become infinite. This will happen when 
a character or byte value never appears in the training samples or, oddly enough, it 
appears with exactly the same frequency in each sample. To avoid this situation, we 










The smoothing factor α reflects the statistical confidence of the sampled training 
data. The larger the value ofα , the less the confidence the samples are truly 
representative of the actual distribution, and thus the byte distribution can be more 
variable. Over time, as more samples are observed in training, α may be decremented 
automatically.  
The formula for the simplified Mahalanobis distance also suggests how to set the 
threshold to detect anomalies. If we set the threshold to 256, this means we allow each 
character to have a fluctuation range of one standard deviation from its mean. Thus, 
logically we may adjust the threshold to a value in increments of 128 or 256, which 
may be implemented as an automatic self-calibration process.  
3.3   Incremental Learning 
The 1-gram model with Mahalanobis distance is very easy to implement as an 
incremental version with only slightly more information stored in each model. An 
incremental version of this method is particularly useful for several reasons. A model 
may be computed on the fly in a “hands-free” automatic fashion. That model will 
improve in accuracy as time moves forward and more data is sampled. Furthermore, 
an incremental online version may also “age out” old data from the model keeping a 
more accurate view of the most recent payloads flowing to or from a service. This 
“drift in environment” can be solved via incremental or online learning [25].  
To age out older examples used in training the model, we can specify a decay 
parameter of the older model and emphasize the frequency distributions appearing in 
the new samples. This provides the means of automatically updating the model to 
maintain an accurate view of normal payloads seen most recently. 
To compute the incremental version of the Mahalanobis distance, we need to 
compute the mean and the standard deviation of each ASCII character seen for each 
new sample observed. For the mean frequency of a character, we compute 
Nxx N
i i == 1 from the training examples. If we also store the number of samples 















x NN  when we 
see a new example 1+Nx , a clever update technique described by Knuth [7].  
Since the standard deviation is the square root of the variance, the variance 
computation can be rewritten using the expected value E as:  
222 )()()()( EXXEEXXEXVar −=−=  
We can update the standard deviation in a similar way if we also store the average 
of the 2ix in the model. 
This requires maintaining only one more 256-element array in each model that 
stores the average of the 2ix and the total number of observations N. Thus, the n-gram 
byte distribution model can be implemented as an incremental learning system easily 
and very efficiently. Maintaining this extra information can also be used in clustering 
samples as described in the next section. 
3.4   Reduced Model Size by Clustering 
When we described our model, we said we compute one model ijM  for each 
observed length bin i of payloads sent to port j. Such fine-grained modeling might 
introduce several problems. First, the total size of the model can become very large. 
(The payload lengths are associated with media files that may be measured in 
gigabytes and many length bins may be defined causing a large number of centroids to 
be computed.) Further, the byte distribution for payloads of length bin i can be very 
similar to that of payloads of length bins i-1 and i+1; after all they vary by one byte. 
Storing a model for each length may therefore be obviously redundant and wasteful.  
Another problem is that for some length bins, there may not be enough training 
samples. Sparseness implies the data will generate an empirical distribution that  will 
be an inaccurate estimate of the true distribution leading to a faulty detector. 
 There are two possible solutions to these problems. One solution for the sparseness 
problem is relaxing the models by assigning a higher smoothing factor to the standard 
deviations which allows higher variability of the payloads. The other solution is to 
“borrow” data from neighboring bins to increase the number of samples; i.e. we use 
data from neighboring bins used to compute other “similar” models.  
We compare two neighboring models using the simple Manhattan distance to 
measure the similarity of their average byte frequency distributions. If their distance is 
smaller than some threshold t, we merge those two models. This clustering technique 
is repeated it until no more neighboring models can be merged. This merging is easily 
computed using the incremental algorithm described in Section 3.3; we update the 
means and variances of the two models to produce a new updated distribution. 
Now for a new observed test data with length i sent to port j, we use the model Mij, 
or the model it was merged with. But there is still the possibility that the length of the 
test data is outside the range of all the computed models.  For such test data, we use 
the model whose length range is nearest to that of the test data. In these cases, the 
mere fact that the payload has such an unusual length unobserved during training may 
itself be cause to generate an alert.   
The reader should note that the modeling algorithm and the model merging process 
are each linear time computations, and hence the modeling technique is very fast and 
can be performed in real time. The online learning algorithm also assures us that 
models will improve over time, and their accuracy will be maintained even when 
services are changed and new payloads are observed. 
3.5   Unsupervised Learning 
Our model together with Mahalanobis distance can also be applied as an unsupervised 
learning algorithm. Thus, training the models is possible even if noise is present in the 
training data (for example, if training samples include payloads from past worm 
propagations still propagating on the internet.) This is based on the assumption that 
the anomalous payload is a minority of the training data and their payload distribution 
is different from the normal payload. These abnormal payloads can be identified in the 
training set and their distributions removed from the model.  This is accomplished by 
applying the learned models to the training dataset to detect outliers. Those anomalous 
payloads will have a much larger distance to the profile than the “average” normal 
samples and thus will likely appear as statistical outliers. After identifying these 
anomalous training samples, we can either remove the outliers and retrain the models, 
or update the frequency distributions of the computed models by removing the counts 
of the byte frequencies appearing in the anomalous training data. We demonstrate the 
effectiveness of these techniques in the evaluation section.   
3.6   Z-String 
Consider the string of bytes corresponding to the sorted, rank ordered byte frequency 
of a model. Figure 4 displays a view of this process. The frequency distribution of 
payloads of length 185 is plotted in the top graph. The lower graph represents the 
same information by the plot is reordered to the rank ordering of the distribution. 
Here, the first bar in the lower plot is the frequency of the most frequently appearing 
ASCII character. The second bar is likewise the second most frequent, and so on. This 
rank ordered distribution surprisingly follows a Zipf-like distribution (an exponential 
function or a power law where there are few values appearing many times, and a large 
number of values appearing very infrequently.) 
The rank order distribution also defines what we call a “Z-string”. The byte values 
ordered from most frequent to least frequent serves as a representative of the entire 
distribution. Figure 5 displays the Z-String for the plot in Figure 4. Notice that for this 
distribution there are only 83 distinct byte values appearing in the distribution. Thus, 
the Z-string has length 83.  
Furthermore, as we shall see later, this rank ordered byte value distribution of the 
new payload deemed anomalous also may serve as a simple representation of a “new 
worm signature” that may be rapidly deployed to other sites to better detect the 
appearance of a new worm at those sites; if an anomalous payload appears at those 
sites and its rank ordered byte distribution matches a Z-string provided from another 
site, the evidence is very good that a worm has appeared. This distribution mechanism 
is part of an ongoing project called “Worminator” [11, 22] that implements a 
“collaborative security” system on the internet. A full treatment of this work is beyond 
the scope of this paper, but the interested reader is encouraged to visit 
http://worminator.cs.columbia.edu/ for details. 
 
Fig. 4.
 Payload distribution appears in the top plot, re-ordered to the rank-ordered count 
frequency distribution in the bottom plot. Notice there are only 83 distinct characters used in 
the average payload for this service (port 80, http) for this length distribution of payloads (all 





α : LF – Line feed   β : CR – Carriage return 
Fig. 5.
 The signature “Z-string” for the average payload displayed in Figure 4.  “e” is the most 
frequent byte value, followed by “t” and so on. Notice how balanced characters appear adjacent 
to each other, for example “()” and “[]” since these tend to appear with equal frequency
 
4   Evaluation of the 1-gram models 
We conducted two sets of experiments to test the effectiveness of the 1-gram models. 
The first experiment was applied to the 1999 DARPA IDS Data Set which is the most 
complete dataset with full payload publicly available for experimental use. The 
experiment here can be repeated by anyone using this data set to verify the results we 
report. The second experiment used the CUCS dataset which is the inbound network 
traffic to the web server of the computer science department of Columbia University. 
Unfortunately, this dataset cannot be shared with other researchers due to the privacy 
policies of the university. (In fact, the dataset has been erased to avoid a breach of 
anyone’s privacy.) 
4.1   Experiments with 1999 DARPA IDS Data Set 
The 1999 DARPA IDS data set was collected at MIT Lincoln Labs to evaluate 
intrusion detection systems. All the network traffic including the entire payload of 
each packet was recorded in tcpdump format and provided for evaluation. In addition, 
there are also audit logs, daily file system dumps, and BSM (Solaris system call) logs. 
The data consists of three weeks of training data and two weeks of test data. In the 
training data there are two weeks of attack-free data and one week of data with labeled 
attacks.  
This dataset has been used in many research efforts and results of tests against this 
data have been reported in many publications.  Although there are problems due to the 
nature of the simulation environment that created the data, it still remains a useful set 
of data to compare techniques. The top results were reported by [10].  
In our experiment on payload anomaly detection we only used the inside network 
traffic data which was captured between the router and the victims. Because most 
public applications on the Internet use TCP (web, email, telnet, and ftp), and to reduce 
the complexity of the experiment, we only examined the inbound TCP traffic to the 
ports 0-1023 of the hosts 172.016.xxx.xxx which contains most of the victims, and 
ports 0-1023 which covers the majority of the network services. For the DARPA 99 
data, we conducted experiments using each packet as the data unit and each 
connection as the data unit. We used tcptrace to reconstruct the TCP connections from 
the network packets in the tcpdump files. We also experimented the idea of “truncated 
payload”, both for each packet and each connection. For truncated packets, we tried 
the first N bytes and the tail N bytes separately, where N is a parameter. Using 
truncated payload saves considerable computation time and space. We report the 
results for each of these models.  
We trained the payload distribution model on the DARPA dataset using week 1 (5 
days, attack free) and week 3 (7 days, attack free), then evaluate the detector on weeks 
4 and 5, which contain 201 instances of 58 different attacks, 177 of which are visible 
in the inside tcpdump data. Because we restrict the victims’ IP and port range, there 
are 14 others we ignore in this test.  
In this experiment, we focus on TCP traffic only, so the attacks using UDP, ICMP, 
ARP (address resolution protocol) and IP only cannot be detected. They include: 
smurf (ICMP echo-reply flood), ping-of-death (over-sized ping packets), UDPstorm, 
arppoison (corrupts ARP cache entries of the victim), selfping, ipsweep, teardrop 
(mis-fragmented UDP packets). Also because our payload model is computed from 
only the payload part of the network packet, those attacks that do not contain any 
payload are impossible to detect with the proposed anomaly detector. Thus, there are 
in total 97 attacks to be detected by our payload model in weeks 4 and 5 evaluation 
data. 
After filtering there are in total 2,444,591 packets, and 49556 connections, with 
non-zero length payloads to evaluate. We build a model for each payload length 
observed in the training data for each port between 0-1023 and for every host 
machine. The smoothing factor is set to 0.001 which gives the best result for this 
dataset (see the discussion in Section 3.2). This helps avoid over-fitting and reduces 
the false positive rate. Also due to having an inadequate number of training examples 
in the DARPA99 data, we apply clustering to the models as described previously. 
Clustering the models of neighboring length bins means that similar models can 
provide more training data for a model whose training data is too sparse thus making it 
less sensitive and more accurate. But there is also the risk that the detection rate will 
be lower when the model allows more variance in the frequency distributions. Based 
on the models for each payload length, we did clustering with a threshold of 0.5, 
which means if the two neighboring model’s byte frequency distribution has less than 
0.5 Manhattan distance we merge their models. We experimented with both 
unclustered and clustered models. The results indicate that the clustered model is 
always better than the unclustered model. So in this paper, we will only show the 
results of the clustered models.  
Different port traffic has different byte variability. For example, the payload to 
port 80 (HTTP requests) are usually less variable than that of port 25 (email). Hence, 
we set different thresholds for each port and check the detector’s performance for each 
port. The attacks used in the evaluation may target one or more ports. Hence, we 
calibrate a distinct threshold for each port and generate the ROC curves including all 
appropriate attacks as ground truth. The packets with distance scores higher than the 
threshold are detected as anomalies.   
Figure 6 shows the ROC curves for the four most commonly attacked ports: 21, 
23, 25, and 80. For the other ports, eg. 53, 143, 513 etc., the DARPA99 data doesn’t 
provide a large enough training and testing sample, so the results for those ports are 
not very meaningful. 
For each port, we used five different data units, for both training and testing. The 
legend in the plots and their meaning are:  
1) Per Packet Model, which uses the whole payload of each network packet;  
2) First 100 Packet Model, which uses the first 100 bytes of each network packet;  
3) Tail 100 Packet Model, which uses the last 100 bytes of each network packet;  
4) Per Conn Model, which uses the whole payload of each connection;  
5) Truncated Conn Model, which uses the first 1000 bytes of each connection. 
 
 
Fig. 6. ROC curves for ports 21, 23, 25, 80 for the five different models. Notice the x-axis scale 
is different for each plot and does not span to 100%, but limited to the worst false positive rate 
for each plot 
From Figure 6 we can see that the payload-based model is very good at detecting 
the attacks to port 21 and port 80. For port 21, the attackers often first upload some 
malicious code onto the victim machine and then login to crash the machine or get 
root access, like casesen and sechole. The test data also includes attacks that 
upload/download illegal copies of software, like warezmaster and warezclient. These 
attacks were detected easily because of their content which were rarely seen 
executable code and quite different from the common files going through FTP.  For 
port 80, the attacks are often malformed HTTP requests and are very different from 
normal requests. For instance, crashiis sends request “GET ../..”; apache2 sends 
request with a lot of repeated “User-Agent:sioux\r\n”, etc. Using payload to detect 
these attacks is a more reliable means than detecting anomalous headers simply 
because their packet headers are all normal to establish a good connection to deliver 
their poison payload. Connection based detection has a better result than the packet 
based models for port 21 and 80. It’s also important to notice that the truncated 
payload models achieve results nearly as good as the full payload models, but are 
much more efficient in time and space.  
For port 23 and port 25 the result is not as good as the models for port 21 and 80. 
That’s because their content are quite free style and some of the attacks are well 
hidden. For example, the framespoofer attack is a fake email from the attacker that 
misdirects the victim to a malicious web site. The website URL looks entirely normal. 
Malformed email and telnet sessions are successfully detected, like the perl attack 
which runs some bad perl commands in telnet, and the sendmail attack which is a 
carefully crafted email message with an inappropriately large MIME header that 
exploits a buffer overflow error in some versions of the sendmail program. For these 
two ports, the packet-based models are better than the connection-based models. This 
is likely due to the fact that the actual exploit is buried within the larger context of the 
entire connection data, and its particular anomalous character distribution is swamped 
by the statistics of the other data portions of the connection. The per packet model 
detects this anomalous payload more easily.  
There are many attacks that involve multiple steps aimed at multiple ports. If we 
can detect one of the steps at any one port, then the attack can be detected 
successfully. Thus we correlate the detector alerts from all the ports and plot the 
overall performance. When we restrict the false positive rate of each port (during 
calibration of the threshold) to be lower than 1%, we achieve about a 60% detection 
rate, which is pretty high for the DARPA99 dataset. The results for each model are 
displayed in the Table 1: 
Table 1.





First 100 Packet Model 55/97 (56.7%) 










Modeling the payload to detect anomalies is useful to protect servers against new 
attacks. Furthermore, careful inspection of the detected attacks in the tables and from 
other sources reveals that correlating this payload detector with other detectors 
increases the coverage of the attack space. There is large non-overlap between the 
attacks detected via payload and other systems that have reported results for this same 
dataset, for example PHAD [13]. This is obvious because the data sources and 
modeling used are totally different. PHAD models packet header data, whereas 
payload content is modeled here.  
Our payload-based model has small memory consumption and is very efficient to 
compute. Table 2 displays the measurements of the speed and the resulting number of 
centroids for each of the models for  both cases of unclustered and clustered. The 
results were derived from measuring PAYL on a 3GHz P4 Linux machine with 2G 
memory using non-optimized Java code. These results do not indicate how well a 
professionally engineered system may behave (re-engineering in C probably would 
gain a factor of 6 or more in speed). Rather, these results are provided to show the 
relative efficiency among the alternative modeling methods. The training and test time 
reported in the table is seconds per 100Mof data, which includes the I/O time. The 
number of centroids computed after training represents an approximation of the total 
amount of memory consumed by each model.  Notice that each centroid has fixed size: 
two 256-element double arrays, one for storing averages and the other for storing the 
standard deviation of the 256 ASCII bytes. A re-engineered version of PAYL would 
not consume as much space as does a Java byte stream object. From the table we can 
see that clustering reduces the number of centroids, and total consumed memory by 
about a factor from 2 to 16 with little or no hit in computational performance. 
Combining Figure 6, Table 1 and Table 2, users can choose the proper model for their 
application according to their environment and performance requirements.  
Table 2.
 Speed and Memory measurements of each model. The training and testing time is in 
units of seconds per 100M data, including the I/O time. The memory comsuption is measured 









Train time(uncl) 26.1 21.8 21.8 8.6 4.4 
Test time(uncl) 16.1 9.4 9.4 9.6 1.6 
No. centroid(uncl) 11583 11583 11583 16326 16326 
Train tme(clust) 26.2 22.0 26.2 8.8 4.6 
Test time(clust) 16.1 9.4 9.4 9.6 1.6 
No. centroid(clust) 4065 7218 6126 2219 1065 
 
This result is surprisingly good for such a simple modeling technique. Most 
importantly, this anomaly detector can easily augment existing detection systems. It is 
not intended as a stand alone detection system but a component in a larger system 
aiming for defense in depth. Hence, the detector would provide additional and useful 
alert information to correlate with other detectors that in combination may generate an 
alarm and initiate a mitigation process.   The DARPA 99 dataset was used here so that 
others can verify our results. However, we also performed experiments on a live 
stream that we describe next. 
4.2   Experiments with CUCS Dataset 
The CUCS dataset denotes Columbia University CS web server dataset, which are two 
traces of incoming traffic with full payload to the CS department web server 
(www.cs.columbia.edu). The two traces were collected separately, one in August 2003 
for 45 hours with a size of about 2GB, and one in September 2003 for 24 hours with 
size 1GB. We denote the first one as A, the second one as B, and their union as AB. 
Because we did not know whether this dataset is attack-free or not, this experiment 
represents an unlabeled dataset that provides the means of testing and evaluating the 
unsupervised training of the models.   
First we display the result of unsupervised learning in Table 3. We used an 
unclustered single-length model since the number of training examples is sufficient to 
adequately model normal traffic. Also the smoothing factor is set to 0.001 and 256 as 
the anomaly threshold. Dataset A has 331,236 non-zero payload packets, and B has 
199,881. The third column shows the number and percentage of packets that are 
deemed anomalous packets. Surprisingly, when we manually checked the anomalous 
packets we found Code Red II attacks and extremely long query string buffer overflow 
attacks in dataset B. (“yes” means the attack is successfully detected.)   
Table 3.
 Unsupervised learning result on CUCS dataset 
Train Test Anomaly # CR-II Buffer 
A A 28(0.0084%) ---- ---- 
A B 2601(1.3%) Yes Yes 
B A 686(0.21%) ---- ---- 
B B 184(0.092%) Yes Yes 
AB AB 211(0.039%) Yes Yes 
 
There is a high anomaly rate when we train on A and test on B; this is because there 
are many pdf file-uploads in B that did not occur in A. (Notice the dates. A was 
captured during the summer; B was captured later during student application time.) 
Because pdf files are encoded with many nonprintable characters, these packets are 
very different from other normal HTTP request packets. For the rest of those detected 
packets, more than 95% are truly anomalous. They include malformed HTTP headers 
like “~~~~~~:~~~~~~~~~”, a string with all capital letter’s, “Weferer” replacing the 
standard Referer tag (apparently a privacy feature of a COTS product), extremely long 
and weird parameters for “range”, javascripts embedded html files sent to the CS 
server, etc. These requests might do no harm to the server, but they are truly unusual 
and should be filtered or redirected to avoid a possible attack. They do provide 
important information as well to other detectors that may deem their connections 
anomalous for other reasons.  
Figure 7 displays a plot of the distance values of the normal packets against the 
attacks. For illustrative purposes, we selected some packets of the Code Red II attack 
and the buffer overflow attack, which has length 1460 and were detected to be 
anomalous, and compare these with the distances of the normal packets of the same 






 The computed Mahalanobis distance of the normal and attack packets 
We also tested some other packets collected from online sources of virus’s as they 
appeared in the wild and within the DARPA 99 data set. These were tested against the 
CUCS dataset. They include Code Red I & II, Nimbda, crashiis, back, apache2 etc. 
All of these tcpdump packets containing virus’s were successfully caught by our 
model.  
For illustrative purposes, we also display in Table 4 the Z-strings of the Code Red 
II and, the buffer overflow attacks and the centroid Z-string to demonstrate how 
different each appears from the norm. Notice these are the Z-strings for one of the 
single malicious packets we captured at packet payload length 1460. Because the full 
Z-string is too long (more than 200 characters) and contains many nonprintable 
characters, we only display the first 20 characters’ ASCII value in decimal for 
illustration. The buffer overflow packet only has 4 different characters, so its Z-string 
has length 4 and are all displayed in the table.  
 
Table 4.
 Illustrations of the partial Z-strings. The characters are shown in ASCII 
Code Red II (first 20 characters) 
88 0 255 117 48 85 116 37 232 100 
100 106 69 133 137 80 254 1 56 51 
Buffer Overflow (all) 
65 37 48 68       
Centroid (first 20 characters) 
48 73 146 36 32 46 61 113 44 110 
59 70 45 56 50 97 110 115 51 53 
5   Conclusion 
The experimental results indicate that the method is effective at detecting attacks. In 
the 1999 DARPA IDS dataset, the best trained model for TCP traffic detected 57 
attacks out of 97 with every port’s false positive rate lower than 1%. For port 80, it 
achieves almost 100% detection rate with around 0.1% false positive rate. It also 
successfully detected the Code Red II and a buffer overflow attack from the unlabeled 
CUCS dataset. The payload model is very simple, state-free, and quick to compute in 
time that is linear in the payload length. It also has the advantage of being 
implemented as an incremental, unsupervised learning method. The payload anomaly 
detector is intended to be correlated with other detectors to mitigate against false 
alarms, and to increase the coverage of attacks that may be detected. The experiment 
also demonstrated that clustering of centroids from neighboring length bins 
dramatically reduce memory consumption up to a factor of 16.  
The Z-string derived from the byte distributions can be used as a “signature” to 
characterize payloads. Each such string is at most 256 characters, and can be readily 
stored and communicated rapidly among sites in a real-time distributed detection 
system as “confirmatory” evidence of a zero-day attack. This can be accomplished 
faster than is otherwise possible by observing large bursts in probing activity among a 
large segment of the internet. This approach may also have great value in detecting 
slow and stealthy worm propagations that may avoid activities of a bursty nature!  
In our future work, we plan to evaluate the technique in live environments, 
implement and measure the costs and speed of the Z-string distribution mechanism 
and most interestingly whether higher order n-grams provide added value or not in 
modeling payload. Furthermore, we plan to evaluate the opportunity or difficulty for 
mimicry attack by comparing the payload distributions across different sites. If, as we 
suspect, each site’s payload distributions are consistently different (in a statistical 
sense), then the anomaly detection approach proposed here, based upon site-specific 
payload models, will provide protection for all sites.  
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